A Bailout for working families? by Montgomerie, Johnna
A bailout for working families?
Johnna Montgomerie
Most accounts of the current financial crisis depict an acute period of excess in the midst
of a credit and asset bubble. Framing the crisis in this way legitimises government and
central bank efforts to provide technical fixes that seek to restore ‘stability and confidence’ in
financial markets. 
The governments of the ‘Anglo-American’ economies at the heart of the crisis, the
United States and the United Kingdom, have shown a surprising willingness to abandon long
held principles of fiscal restraint, independent central banking and rules-based economic
policymaking in favour of discretionary political interventions to stem the financial crisis.
These include coordinated liquidity injections, nationalisation, asset buyback schemes, the
mass selling of government bonds and quantitative easing. As it turns out, confidence and
stability are neither objective standards nor something that can be measured, but a general
feeling among investors and creditors that must be cultivated at great cost. These measures
may have been necessary to prevent systemic financial collapse, but the long term conse-
quences will most likely be borne by the average working family. 
This article argues that policies for economic recovery need to focus on the financial
crisis facing working households as much, or even more than, the problems in the financial
services industry as a whole. Anglo-American households are now hugely indebted, are
bearing the brunt of the economic downturn and, most likely, will disproportionately pay for
the costs of recovery. Continuing to ignore the precarious financial instability of households
takes for granted the socio-political importance of household consumption and its central
role as the bedrock of economic growth. Taking issue with Anglo-American household
indebtedness is not new, since debt levels have been consistently increasing for decades;
but the recent credit and asset bubble has seriously compounded the problem and jeopar-
dised the financial security of many working families. 
For some, current household debt levels reflect households’ lack of financial sophistica-
tion or education as they were too easily duped into taking on more debt then they could
afford. For others the recent expansion in household borrowing is the product of rational
responses to economic stimuli as households chose to take on more debts when nominal
interest rates were low in order to benefit from rising property prices. Still others blame
indebtedness on the loss of prudence within Anglo-American society as individuals seek to
consume whatever they please without any consideration for the limits of income. 
This article takes a different perspective by looking at the cumulative effects of two
decades of political and economic restructuring combined with the most recent period of
financialisation in Anglo-America as the causes of the financial crisis now facing the house-
hold sector. More specifically, I argue that slow income growth and the broader ‘politics of
abandonment’ contributed to rising debt levels and financial instability for many working
families.
Minimal real income growth, especially compared to rapidly rising debt levels, is an
overlooked aspect of most analyses of household indebtedness. For many working families
incomes have not kept pace with growing expenditures. In fact many of the staples of
middle class life, such as homeownership and education but also cars and vacations, are
now funded by ever larger loans. There is also evidence that many households use credit
cards to pay for daily expenses such as food and utilities. The causes of stagnant real
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income growth are not straightforward; rather they are the product of interrelated trends
such as the economic governance priorities of low inflation and the business community’s
efforts to constrain wage growth. The Anglo-American governments’ longstanding commit-
ment to maintain low inflation by specifically targeting ‘wage expectations’ curtailed income
growth for most working households. During this same time the corporate sector pushed
hard against wage concessions even as productivity and profitability increased. 
The ‘politics of abandonment’ refers to the business community and government’s
changing priorities towards its workforce and citizens over the past two decades. For
example, corporate governance priorities, extending out to the private sector at large, have
been fixated on permanent restructuring. Even in the boom years the largest and most
profitable corporations were continuously shedding jobs and rolling back non-wage
benefits to improve shareholder value. Concomitantly government services, at all levels
from municipalities to national governments, have been reduced or eliminated for the
majority of working families and restricted to the small percentage of households with no
other means. The reconfiguring of pensions and education funding and unemployment
benefits have contributed to many families’ need to borrow heavily in order to maintain
what were previously considered middle class entitlements.
To substantiate this claim we begin with a macro picture of the growing scale of
household indebtedness in both the US and the UK. In the US households’ total debt
outstanding doubled after 1999, reaching $12 trillion in 2007. UK household debt levels
tripled over the same period reaching £1.2 trillion. But importantly this figure vastly under-
estimates debt outstanding because it excludes securitised loans (or those moved off
lenders’ balance sheets). Significantly, this stock of debt represents an increasing propor-
tion of total GDP output and consumer expenditure, making the financial crisis facing
households as important as the one facing Wall Street or The City. 
The second section examines how these macro trends translate at the household
level. Using the US Survey of Consumer Finances, which has the most accurate and
comprehensive data (there is no equivalent in the UK) we see the changing scale of liabili-
ties and slow income growth faced by middle income families over the past two decades. 
The final section considers potential ways forward by arguing for political, in addition
to technical, reforms to the financial services sector and macroeconomic policymaking.
The financialisation of consumption
The concept of financialisation offers an account of present day capitalism in which financial
accumulation and innovation are primary drivers of change; and, as a result, individuals,
firms, and the macro-economy are increasingly mediated by new relations with financial
markets (Parenteau, 2005; Montgomerie, 2008). The advent of ‘shareholder value’, the rise of
institutional investors and other new financial actors in the ‘shadow banking system’, as well
as the arrival of a mass investment culture are elements of Anglo-American financialisation
(Froud, Leaver et al, 2007; Pinault, 2007). As such, financialisation is a framework for
evaluating more comprehensively how social actors located at the privileged sites of
accumulation accrue new political and economic power (Krippner, 2005). With the City and
Wall Street at their core, the Anglo-American economies are the epicentre of global financial
expansion and crisis. Yet financialisation is an aspiration, rather than a coherent system, as
actors and markets attempt to find coherence but often fail. 
Financialisation impacted households through transformations in savings and
borrowing patterns. Here we focus on the latter, where transformations in household
lending trends were based on a confluence of three interrelated developments: (1) unique
macroeconomic conditions; (2) the advent of asset-backed securitisation as part of broad
based financial market innovation and expansion; and (3) relatedly, the growing sophistica-
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tion of credit scoring techniques. Of course each of these trends has its own unique
pattern of development, but it is their culmination in the recent conjuncture that made
indebtedness such a pervasive phenomenon. 
Benign macroeconomic conditions after 2001 included low inflation and low nominal
interest rates, combined with fiscal expansion (to fund the occupations of Iraq and
Afghanistan) and foreign investors’ insatiable appetite for fixed income bonds or securities
(Crotty, 2008). These conditions created a period of excess liquidity and cheap credit as well
as rapid ascent in asset prices. This, in turn, fed into household lending directly through
Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), galvanising low interest rates, excess liquidity and foreign
investors’ appetites for debt securities into a prolonged housing and consumer boom. 
The growing reliance on asset-backed securitisation (in the ‘originate and distribute’
model) fundamentally transformed the structure of household lending, from the emergence
of the universal banking model to the arrival of non-financial institutions and new specialist
lenders (Erturk and Solari, 2007). Besides changes in wholesale credit markets, there were
also important developments in retail lending practices, as many lenders became mass
marketing machines for every manner of financial product. In terms of lending, advances in
credit scoring adapted the plethora of digital data sources on individuals into usable quan-
tities which were adapted into risk profiles, used to calibrate loan rates and terms as well
as target promotional offers (Langley, 2008). 
These developments facilitated an astronomical increase in household debt levels,
especially since 2001. Figure 1, from the US Flow of Funds, provides the clearest picture of
moderate debt growth, from $1.2 trillion in 1980 to $5.9 trillion in 1999; and the subsequent
doubling of outstanding debts over the next eight years, reaching $12 trillion in 2007. 
Figure 1: United States flow of funds – household liabilities by type
(Source Flow of Funds, Table 1153: home mortgages (FL153165105.Q) and consumer credit
(FL153166000.Q))
A similar picture emerges in the UK, although the data only begins in 1993, where total
amount outstanding of mortgage (secured) and consumer (unsecured) loans was £588 billion
in 1999 and nearly tripled to £1.2 trillion in 2008. It is important to note that the UK figures
only include loans on lenders’ balance sheets, meaning they exclude securitisation and, as a
result, significantly underestimate the true amount of debt held by the household sector.
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Figure 2: United Kingdom, amounts outstanding of lending to individuals 
(Source: Bank of England, Amounts outstanding of total sterling net lending to individuals (in billions), (SA)
series: LPQVTXK and LPQVZRI)
This staggering rate of growth demonstrates a new dependence on debt to access
homeownership and fuel consumption. Importantly, Anglo-American households’ growing
indebtedness fuelled a prolonged economic expansion in both the US and UK, especially
since 2001. As such, the term ‘financialisation of consumption’ is not simply about
individuals’ closer connections to capital markets; rather, it refers to how debt-led
consumption bolstered financialised expansion. 
Table 1 illustrates this by comparing the total amount of outstanding debts (Figures 1
and 2 as a proportion of GDP and household consumption expenditure. Although we are not
comparing like for like, Table 1 demonstrates that total household debt outstanding is equiva-
lent to 92 per cent of US GDP and 100 per cent of UK GDP (note total debts excludes
securitised loans) in 2008. Therefore, households’ total debt outstanding is approximately
equal to the total GDP output of both Anglo-American economies. Using an expenditure
measure of GDP, household or personal consumption, total debt outstanding is 131 per cent
in the US and 162 per cent in the UK in 2008. This means that the total stock of household
debt in both the US and UK is larger than households’ total expenditure in the economy.
Table 1: Total debts as proportion of GDP and household expenditure
(Sources: United States, Bureau of Economic Analysis: Gross Domestic Product (Table 1.2.5) and
Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product (Table 2.3.5); United Kingdom: Office for
National Statistics Gross Domestic Product at market prices CP SA (series YBHA) and Household final
consumption expenditure CP SA (series ABJQ))
 
 United States  United Kingdom 
Total mortgage & 
consumer debt 
as % of GDP as % of Personal 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
 as % of GDP as % of 
Household Final 
Consumption 
1990 58 88  n/a n/a 
1995 62 92  61 100 
2000 68 99  66 105 
2005 92 132  90 144 
2008 92 131  100 162 
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As the bedrock of the Anglo-American economies, household consumption is the single
largest segment of domestic growth. In 1989, Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) was
65.5 per cent of US GDP, compared to all gross domestic investment which was only 16.5
per cent, demonstrating the relative importance of consumer expenditure on durable goods,
consumer products, and services to the American economy as a whole. In 2008, Personal
Consumption Expenditure grew to 70.5 per cent of GDP, while gross domestic investment
declined to 15.5 per cent. Similarly, in the UK Household Final Consumption (HFC) is also
the largest component of GDP. In 1989, Household Financial Consumption was 60 per cent
of GDP and total fixed capital investment was 21 per cent. By 2009, HFC rose slightly to 62
per cent and total investment declined substantially to 15.8 per cent. 
Strangely enough, it seems that throughout the period of financialisation-based expan-
sion, consumption grew while private investment declined as a relative proportion of GDP.
It may seem paradoxical that under the auspices of financialisation, where unhindered
financial market expansion led to record profits, personal consumption grew while private
domestic investment declined. The dividends of financialisation appear not to have trans-
lated into significant investment in the Anglo-American economies; instead it bolstered
debt-led consumption by households.
Perhaps it is not surprising to some that household debt levels grew so precipitously
during the recent credit boom. Indeed there have been many warnings from both sides of
the Atlantic that household indebtedness is extremely problematic for long term growth. 
Yet, so far we have only seen the supply side explanation of rising household indebted-
ness: benign macroeconomic conditions, low nominal interest rates and rising asset prices all
provided the necessary means for debt levels to grow. This fails to account for why house-
holds demanded so much credit in the first place. The next section details the cumulative
effects of the longer trajectory of economic and political restructuring in the Anglo-American
economies that contributed to households’ need to borrow. That is, slow income growth and
the politics of abandonment fostered a business climate of permanent restructuring, and
government rollbacks in social and economic support for the majority of working families.
The household’s financial crisis
The importance of rising household indebtedness is not simply about a general loss of
prudence, be it by individuals, lenders or the government. Rather, this trend speaks directly to
the importance of a large (solvent) middle class in creating the economic expansion and
prosperity of the post-war era. 
The fact that middle income households are mired in debt speaks volumes about the
bigger and more long-term problems facing the Anglo-American economies, alongside the
immediate effects of the financial crisis and recession. The past thirty years of economic
and political restructuring – call it globalisation, or neo-liberalism, or more recently financiali-
sation – has entailed the stifling of wage growth, receding government services and
support, as well as the virtual abdication of social responsibility by the business community. 
All of these trends have been well documented elsewhere. For instance, the changing
structure of labour markets and flexible employment policies, all aimed at fostering global
competitiveness, led to low paid service work replacing well paid jobs in the manufacturing
sector (Glyn, 2006). Also, there has been a substantial increase in income inequality in
Anglo-America, where the gap between the upper quartile of income earners and the rest
grows bigger every year (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Froud, Johal et al, 2001; Dumenil and
Levy, 2004). Moreover, non-wage benefits like pensions, and also health care benefits in
the US, have been in terminal decline for the average worker (Lazonick and O’Sullivan,
2000). Add to this the reduction in government support for the majority of working families
in favour of benefits for the few with no other means: for example, unemployment benefits
RENEWAL Vol 17 No. 3 2009
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are increasingly difficult to qualify for and below a living wage, meaning households are left
to deal with the consequences of restructuring on their own.
So far we have only dealt with general macro-level trends and not considered how
these are reflected at the household level. Using the US Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), which provides the most comprehensive household data with no equivalent in the
UK, we see a detailed picture of the changing scale and composition of liabilities for
median income families (where 50 per cent of families fall below and above) over the past
two decades. This provides an illustration of the outcomes for households that contributed
to the rapid escalation of debt outstanding as seen in the figures from Figure 1. As such
these figures are for families with debt holdings (rather than ‘All Families’ which would
include renters or those that own their homes outright), in order to roughly match up the
macro and household level data. 
Figure 3: United States - Median income families, average total debt outstanding and income
(Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, Mortgage debt = total value of mortgages, home equity loans and
home equity lines of credit secured by primary residence; Consumer Debt = total value of all outstanding
loans on credit cards, instalment loans, other lines of credit, vehicle and education loans; Income from all
sources Quintile 2, adjusted for inflation using CPI-U)
Figure 3 shows the changing scale of indebtedness for middle income households: we see
that over the past two decades, total debts outstanding have more than doubled, while real
pre-tax income grew by just 80 per cent over the same period. To put this in context, in 1992
median income families had total debts equal to 2.5 times their income; by 2007, total debts
were just under three times income levels. 
The US data shows that household indebtedness is not just a product of the recent
credit boom. Instead, it suggests that median income households have been on a long
trajectory of accumulating ever more debt, which was compounded by the post-2001
credit bubble. More important than the amount of debt is the cost of servicing outstanding
loans. In 2007, median income families paid $11,668 per year in loan repayments, which is
an astounding 42 per cent of pre-tax income levels. With such a large proportion of income
already diverted to debt repayment there is not much room for further expanding house-
hold borrowing; indeed this demonstrates the financial insecurity already faced by the
comparatively well off median income families.
This growing scale of indebtedness is matched by an increase in types of household
borrowing, demonstrating the degree to which debt has become a necessity in achieving
$15,414 $17,104 
$19,827
$23,446 $25,378
$27,932 
$55,163
$83,778
$80,486 
$59,808
$42,023 
$38,343 
$0 
$10,000 
$20,000 
$30,000 
$40,000 
$50,000 
$60,000 
$70,000 
$80,000 
$90,000 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Consumer
Debt
Mortgage
Debt
Income
27
Renewal17.3  29/10/2009  16:59  Page 27
and maintaining the Anglo-American middle class way of life. There is growing evidence,
mainly from the US, that shows households are using debt to finance almost every facet of
daily life (Schor, 1998). This is partly because income levels have not kept pace with the
growing demands on household expenditures. 
The causes of slow income growth are clear: both Anglo-American governments have
remained singularly committed to controlling inflation, specifically wage-led inflation
(Temple, 2000; Wilkinson, 2000; Hay, 2004). Of course, this policy led to the contradictory
outcomes of curtailing wage inflation while allowing asset price inflation to escalate
unchecked. The example of homeownership makes the interplay between these policies
and household borrowing clearer: homeownership was fuelled by providing loans at ever
larger multiples of income and, during the credit boom, this practice further stoked
property price increases (Hay, 2009). Not only did the working consensus between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ inflation create an unsustainable credit and asset price bubble, it also has long
term effects for working families: home ownership is becoming increasingly unaffordable. 
This is not just a matter of government policy. In addition the business community as a
whole pushed equally hard against wage gains and non-wage benefits. Over the past two
decades Anglo-American business culture has been gripped by the logic of permanent
restructuring. Outsourcing, downsizing, streamlining, alongside rollbacks to non-executive
pension plans, and most importantly health care benefits in the US, have all been justified to
make business more competitive or to realise shareholder value (Froud, Haslam et al, 2000;
Jackson, 2002; Aglietta, 2008). Even during the boom years, with productivity gains and
robust corporate profits, successive rounds of job cuts or outsourcing were commonplace.
The consequence for Anglo-American working families facing this prolonged political
and economic restructuring is that debt is being used as a ‘plastic safety net’ (Wheary and
Draut, 2005). In order to cope with job loss, illness, or one off misfortunes like major
repairs, many families borrow just to get by (Draut and Silva, 2003). 
It seems that the Anglo-American governments’ success in curbing public expenditure
has simply meant private debt has replaced public debt. For example, reductions in unem-
ployment benefits and capping of pension (or social security) outlays may have helped the
national budget, but for households this has meant accessing more debt to maintain their
standard of living (Cutler and Waine, 2001; Brewer, Clark et al, 2002). Another example is
university education where, in both the US and the UK, loans replaced bursaries and
grants for students – making access to credit an important element for gaining access to
higher education. Even basic education is affected, as many middle class families are
willing to pay premiums to live in a catchment area for a ‘good school’, which typically
means taking on a bigger mortgage (Warren and Tyagi, 2003). 
It is through these subtle ways that household indebtedness has accumulated to its
current levels. In addition to major expenditures a recent Demos survey in the US found
that one third of households reported using credit cards to cover basic living expenses in,
on average, four out of the last twelve months (Wheary and Draut, 2005). The demands on
middle income families to pay for cars, holidays, childcare and extra-curricular activities, as
well as more mundane consumer expenditures like clothing and electronics, mean ever
more claims against household incomes (Schor, 1998). It is these trends, not just the
unique conditions of the credit bubble, which we must consider when assessing the
causes of rising household debt levels.
Therefore, middle income households are spending beyond the limits of income to
preserve a standard of living established over a generation ago. Indeed, the post-war
expansion made middle income household consumption the backbone of the Anglo-
American economies, as well as a strongly held socio-cultural norm which has profound
political meaning in defining our way of life. Slow income growth, along with the politics of
abandonment, and in particular a business climate of permanent restructuring and govern-
RENEWAL Vol 17 No. 3 2009
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ment rollbacks in social and economic support for the majority of working families, all
contributed to households’ growing demand for debt to plug the gap between income and
expenditure. Therefore indebtedness cannot be reduced to a single causal relationship;
rather it is a product of the cumulative effects of political and economic transformations
and socio-cultural factors.
Conclusion
Current plans for economic recovery are focused primarily on creating conditions to restore
investor confidence and making more credit available to foster investments which, eventually,
will kick-start economic growth. But if private investment declined as a relative proportion of
GDP during the prolonged period of cheap credit and booming markets, how could such a
utopian vision of recovery ever be possible? 
It seems that recovery plans hinge on re-establishing the economic climate that existed
before the crisis hit, with households borrowing and spending at the same levels. Such an
optimistic view belies the reality faced by many middle income working families who are
already sitting on a huge stock of debts with substantial repayment obligations. Add to this
the fact that the current financial crisis has decimated working families’ investment portfo-
lios, while falling property prices threaten to eliminate housing wealth. It appears that many
of the supposed gains of financialisation only existed on paper, while middle income house-
holds are now left servicing a mountain of debt. With unemployment rising and the
prospects of wage increases as remote as ever there seems to be no other notion of how to
boost consumption that does not entail households acquiring even more debt.
I have sought to highlight the point that access to credit is no replacement for real wage
growth and adequate social protection. As such, political interventions to stem the current
economic downturn need to address the financial instability facing the household sector. 
Of course growing household indebtedness could simply be dismissed as hyper-
consumerism gone mad, where people spend without any consideration for the limits of
income. But this notion ignores the pivotal importance of household consumption in
fuelling economic growth and the reality that the Anglo-American households are the
consumers of last resort in the global economy. Moreover, consumerism is a powerful
socio-cultural norm that has come to define middle class prosperity. These factors influ-
ence the prospects for economic recovery as households (and policymakers) face a double
bind: curtail spending now to pay down existing debts and risk a further downturn in
economic growth, or continue debt-led spending and risk insolvency.
Not only have policymakers failed to acknowledge the current financial crisis facing
many working families, but households are now expected to absorb the proscribed tax
increases and further reductions in government services to remedy the fiscal deficits
incurred to fund the massive bailouts of the financial services industry. For instance, both
of the UK’s main political parties have already committed themselves to substantial cuts in
government services in the near future. As unemployment increases, and business
squeezes wage growth further, working families face more of the same conditions that
created households’ financial insecurity in the first place. 
By trying to restore finance-led growth, both Anglo-American governments are only
prolonging the erosion of a vibrant, and solvent, household sector. Moreover, if long term
recovery requires further reductions social protection and stifling of wage growth, this will
only exacerbate the financial crisis already facing most working families. The problem is
that the current consensus on reform focuses only on technical fixes to improve the inner
workings of financial markets. What is needed is political reform of economic governance
priorities, which until now have overwhelmingly privileged financialised growth.
Political reforms to economic governance priorities, for example, would require
29
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rethinking low inflation priorities that have only focused on wage expectations and not asset
prices. The past two decades of prioritising the quelling of wage-led inflation, while allowing
asset prices to increase unchecked, greatly contributed to our current economic instability.
Since low inflation facilitated low nominal interest rates, many households had to borrow
ever larger multiples of their income to access the property market in the same way that
investors used highly leveraged buy-outs and mergers to cash in on rising asset values.
Continuing to stifle wage growth in order to facilitate low inflation, and thus nominal
interest rates, in the belief it will spur investment is nothing more than an attempt to re-
establish the conditions of the last credit/asset bubble. Admittedly, incomes policies have
long been discredited as tools of macroeconomic governance, but the current financial
crisis facing the household sector suggests that household income levels can no longer be
ignored in economic policymaking.
Another pressing political issue is whether households should pay for bailing out the
financial services industry, either through tax increases, or reduction in services, or both.
Populist claims that this amounts to the privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses
are not without merit, since there seems to be no effort to consider how the financial
services industry will pay for its own bailout over the long term. 
A straightforward approach could be to introduce a transaction tax on financial
products, such as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives or stocks purchases. This would be
akin to the sales tax or VAT paid by households on the majority of products they purchase
in daily life. This would be as viable an option as any to plug the fiscal gap because stocks
and OTC derivatives are discreet products exchanged in much the same way as any
consumer product. A small transaction tax would not only provide much needed funds to
pay back the costs of the bailout, from which all of the financial services industry benefited
in some way, it would also serve to quell speculative volatility in these markets in the
future. Yet policymakers have no immediate plans to implement such a proposal because it
is so far away from the current economic governance priorities to save the financial
markets from their own misadventures.
Johnna Montgomerie is a research fellow at the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural
Change (CRESC) at the University of Manchester.
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